Science typically employs Aristotelian categorization, using a fixed checklist of properties. If something has all the properties, it fits. If one is missing, it’s out. However, people typically rely on prototypes, meaning examples that feel most typical. We ask: is this similar to a “good” example of the category?
Take birds. The Aristotelian view says: a bird has feathers and flies. But what about penguins? They don’t fly, yet we still see them as birds. A penguin might be a prototypical bird in some cultures but not in others. Prototype theory accounts for cultural variation, allowing for more flexible, sensitive categorization.
Judges also perform categorization. Judges must decide: Does this practice count as enslavement? Or forced marriage? Or something else? Traditionally, legal reasoning is Aristotelian, but this is imperfect for cultural practices. This is where prototype theory can help.
Dominic Ongwen, a former commander in the LRA (a Ugandan guerrilla group) stood trial at the International Criminal Court for participating in a system of “bush wives”, abducted girls forced to serve as wives, and endure physical and sexual violence. The judges categorized this as ‘other inhumane acts’. For this broad legal category, judges had to show that this conduct was similar to, but also distinct from, other crimes.
The judges used an Aristotelian approach, assessing legal categories using checklists. For forced marriage, they evaluated whether the practice resembled recognized crimes in severity, but contained distinct elements, such as different kinds of harm. They concluded that bush wives suffered stigma, psychological trauma, and deprivation of choice absent from other crimes but similar in gravity.
Quackelbeen’s highlights significant problems with this. Testimony showed that all LRA returnees faced stigma, and the main hardship was returning with children, not marital status. Judges relied on a forced marriage checklist rather than exploring Acholi marriage customs, missing key context. Their emphasis on exclusive conjugal relationships leaned on Western marriage concepts, disregarding Ugandan and Acholi marriage customs, which have certain ceremonial, spiritual and polygamous traits.
To address this, Quackelbeen proposes judges should consider a prototypical marriage within the relevant culture. In Acholi society, marriage typically involves a ceremony, family, and community recognition. The LRA’s so-called “marriages” lacked these elements. Viewed through prototype theory, these relationships resemble enslavement more than marriage.
Quackelbeen shows how the ICC risks imposing Western-centric categories on diverse societies. Prototype theory offers a more culturally sensitive alternative, allowing judges to understand and respect cultural realities behind legal labels.
