Commandant Maksym V. Kiriakidi | How Crimea Became Russia’s Launchpad for Invasion

Ukraine’s own fleet, by contrast, was gutted: more than four-fifths of its ships were seized by the occupying forces, and 83% of its personnel remained rather than relocate to mainland Ukraine. The researchers argue that these were not incidental consequences of annexation, but the opening moves of a much longer campaign.

Crimea’s position, jutting deep into the Black Sea, meant that whoever controlled it could dominate the surrounding sea lanes. Within months, Russia was expanding its naval base at Sevastopol and standing up new coastal-defence and missile units across the peninsula.

Air regiments were reorganised and re-equipped, flying strike, reconnaissance and transport aircraft from Crimean airfields, while air-defence systems and newly formed ground brigades rounded out what became a largely self-sufficient land, air and sea force.

Over the following years this combined system grew steadily in scale and sophistication, and in the weeks before February 2022 it was reinforced further still, as additional landing ships and naval assets moved into the Black Sea, thickening the military grouping arrayed along Ukraine’s coastline.

Alongside this military buildup, the researchers document a sustained campaign of pressure on Ukraine that never quite tipped into open war. The Kerch Bridge, built in 2018 and 2019, restricted the size of ships able to reach Ukraine’s Azov Sea ports, cutting into their trade.

Commercial vessels bound for Mariupol and Berdiansk faced prolonged, often unjustified inspections. Captured offshore gas platforms were repurposed for surveillance of passing shipping, and GPS signals were deliberately spoofed to confuse navigation. At times, whole sections of the Black Sea were closed off under the guise of ‘exercises’, disrupting established international shipping routes to Ukraine.

By 2021, military exercises in and around Crimea had grown considerably larger and more elaborate, rehearsing amphibious landings, mobilisation and joint operations across the army, navy and air force.

The researchers conclude that the occupation of Crimea functioned as a staging ground: eight years of steady military growth and hybrid pressure that quietly built the platform from which the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was ultimately launched in 2022. By mapping how pressure and buildup can escalate into war, they hope others might recognise the pattern before it repeats.